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In order to cope with threats and safeguard U.S. interests, the new U.S. 
maritime strategy puts forward six major missions for sea power: deploy 
decisive sea power in a forward position in limited conf licts of regional 
scale; deter war between major powers; win wars for the nation; safeguard 
homeland security from long-distance; promote and maintain cooperative 
relationships with more international partners; and prevent or eliminate 
regional destruction before it affects the international system. To accom-
plish these six missions, U.S. sea power must possess the corresponding six 
core capabilities, including the capability to be in a forward position (pres-
ent global deployment), deterrence capability, sea control capability, force 
projection capability, the capability to safeguard public order at sea, and 
humanitarian assistance and disaster response capability.
SPECIAL TEXT FOR THIS PAGE 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the latest put forward by 
the United States, represents the first major revision of [U.S.] maritime 
strategy in twenty years. The 1986 Maritime Strategy was essentially a Cold 
War era strategy with “war as the nucleus,” mainly for establishing sea 
supremacy. The objective was global confrontation with the Soviet Navy. 
Obviously, with the Soviet Union’s disintegration and the Soviet Navy’s de-
cline, the “1986 edition” of the U.S. maritime strategy was already obsolete. 
Faced with the new international situation of counterterrorism following 
the “9/11” incident and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the 
rapid rise of developing nations and the formation of a multipolar world, 
[and] as a result of over two years of debate and discussion by the U.S. 
Navy’s theoretical circle, the “2007 edition” of the maritime strategy, which 
brandishes the great banner of “international cooperation” and a plausible 
new face, was finally issued. 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is composed of six sec-
tions: introduction, challenges for the new era, maritime strategic concepts, 
strategic implementation, tasks prioritized for implementation, and con-
clusion. This essay gives a brief analysis to offer insights into the new trends 
of the U.S. Navy.
THE NEW U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY SURFACES
Lu Rude
1
Rude: The New U.S. Maritime Strategy Surfaces
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008
 LU RUDE 55
A DUALITY OF THE ANGLE OF VIEW: PREVENTING AND WINNING 
WAR ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT
In the introduction to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, there 
is a conspicuous new viewpoint: it is written unequivocally that “Preventing 
and Winning War Are Equally Important.” In the past, the U.S. Navy’s strategy 
emphasized “gain the initiative by striking fi rst” and “win by war,” and it was all 
about warfare preparations and operations planning. The new strategy believes 
that “maritime power should both be devoted to winning wars decisively, and 
to increasing war prevention capability,” thus attaching importance to contain-
ing war before it occurs. Elevating war prevention to the same strategic status of 
importance as winning war in military theory represents a major change in the 
U.S. naval strategy. This is a reaffi rmation of the internationally and universally 
recognized “maritime military operations other than war.” It can be foreseen 
that henceforth the international cooperation and noncombat use of navies will 
increase. This will become a new common bright point for activities at sea by 
the world’s navies.
AN ENTIRELY NEW WAY OF THINKING: MARITIME INTERESTS CAN-
NOT BE DICTATED BY ONE COUNTRY
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower describes the current and fu-
ture threats facing the United States as “the continuous increase of transnational 
actors, rogue states, proliferation of weapon technologies and information, and 
natural disasters.” “The vast majority of the world’s population lives within sev-
eral hundred kilometers from the sea. This necessitates an entirely new way of 
thinking about the role of maritime power.” Following the implementation of 
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, world oceanic trends have experi-
enced a great change, and the oceans have become a new domain for rivalry. The 
United States recognized that “no one country alone has suffi cient resources to 
guarantee the security of the entire maritime space.” Therefore, this strategy 
“appeals to every government, non-governmental organization, international 
organization and private institution to develop partnership relationships based 
on common interests to address the frequently occurring new threats.”
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. stra-
tegic goals were confused for a while. Following the “9/11” incident, however, the 
United States has regained its sense, “enemies can very well use unconventional 
warfare to win over America’s superior military strength.” This has forced the 
United States to rethink its maritime strategy and realize that the U.S. homeland 
and global strategic interests were no longer threatened by a fi xed strategic op-
ponent. Rather, the United States faces a multitude of potential threats.
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The United States is the promoter of unipolarity, all along relying on its pow-
erful naval fl eets to dominate the seas and safeguard America’s own interests. 
But the tremendous change in the international system makes it begin to think 
reasonably that the present maritime issues affect each nation’s interests, that no 
one country can dominate, and that all forces must be mobilized in the world to 
jointly safeguard the “common interests” at sea. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower clearly proposes that “collective security activities will be con-
ducted to address common threats and assemble common interests in an open 
and multipolar world, and maritime power will be used to build confi dence 
and mutual trust among nations.” It is important to note that this is the fi rst 
time that U.S. offi cial writings have put forward [the concept of] a transition 
to multipolarity and the construction of “cooperative partnerships” based on 
maritime common interests.
In the section on strategy implementation, the new maritime strategy has 
clear differences from the “1986 edition,” placing the utmost emphasis on “war 
prevention through cooperation in each region, and not waiting for war to break 
out to win it. Particularly when confronting the threat of terrorism, we must use 
forward deployed forces to stop terrorism as far away from the U.S. coastline as 
possible, thus guaranteeing the absolute security of the U.S. homeland.”
One can see that the new U.S. maritime strategy emphasizes “military soft-
ware” such as “humanitarian rescue missions and improving cooperative rela-
tions between the United States and every country,” thus attempting to achieve 
the goals of preventing war and maintaining peace. If it can be achieved, this is 
a rational choice suitable for the present international circumstances. All coun-
tries have a great need to explore the new thinking of developing mutual assis-
tance and common prosperity to remove divergences and jointly safeguard the 
peace of the oceans. This is also the international obligation of “peaceful use of 
the oceans” and “joint management of the oceans” advocated in the U.N. Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea.
This could be a major change in the U.S. military’s maritime strategy. It must 
receive the affi rmation of all the world’s nations.
STRATEGIC FOCUS: SHIFT FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE PACIFIC
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower states: from now on, U.S. mili-
tary strength will be concentrated in “areas where tension escalates, or in re-
gions in which we hope to demonstrate to friendly nations and allies the U.S. 
海军是战略地区的核心力量. 美国海军继续充当美国全球战略的急先锋与主力军.
The Navy is the core force in strategic regions. The U.S. Navy continues to serve as the daring van-
guard and main force of U.S. global strategy.
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resolve to maintain stability, and regions where the U.S. realizes its obli-
gations to its allies.” “The U.S. will continue to deploy strong operational 
power in the Western Pacific, and the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, 
to safeguard U.S. and allied interests and to deter potential competitors.” 
In fact, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy declared: the new strategy “not only 
discusses things that we want to do, we have already begun to do some of 
these things,” such as having already deployed forces in these two regions 
of strategic importance.
The Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea are the “energy lifelines,” 
and they constitute a strategic thoroughfare that America’s global strat-
egy must guarantee. The Middle East is a “powder keg,” and these seas 
were the maritime battlegrounds of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraq “War to 
Overthrow Saddam” and the Afghan War. Moreover, these are regions in 
which several countries possess nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear 
proliferation exists. By setting up pointed defenses and carrying out 
strategic deployment, the United States is prepared to act at any time and to 
intervene.
The Western Pacific is the area of most intense competition among na-
tions for maritime sovereignty. It is also a region that has the highest con-
centration and fastest growth in terms of the world’s naval forces. Some 
Asian countries are rising rapidly, have abundant economic and techno-
logical strength, and possess nuclear weapons or the capability to devel-
op them; they will directly inf luence and challenge American hegemony. 
Moreover, Asia is the region in which the United States has concluded and 
signed the highest number of defense treaties, an important sea area in 
which the United States has implemented island chain defense. Therefore, 
according to the new U.S. strategy, the Western Pacific is determined to 
be “a region of high tension” where the United States has the responsibil-
ity to “carry out treaty obligations” to its allies and to “contain potential 
strategic competitors.”
Consequently, the United States not only increases its military strength on 
the Japanese mainland and in the Ryukyu Islands, it also dispatches carrier 
battle groups to cruise around in a heightened state of war readiness. For “hu-
manitarian objectives” and “the requirements of international cooperation,” 
the Western Pacifi c is the sea area where the U.S. military conducts the largest 
and most frequent maritime exercises with its allies. Such frequent transna-
tional and multinational maritime military exercises were not possible more 
than a decade ago, and this is the evidence that the new U.S. maritime strategy 
has already been put into effect.
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FORWARD DEPLOYMENT: STRATEGY TO DOMINATE THE OCEAN 
CAN BE TRACED TO THE SAME ORIGIN
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower believes: major changes have 
taken place in the global strategic environment, and the United States faces 
threats dispersed all over the world. Therefore, it is necessary to give full play 
to the “expeditionary” and “multi-role” characteristics of sea power, and adopt 
globally “dispersed deployment to defend the homeland and U.S. citizens, and 
promote our interests on a global scale.”
Obviously, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower has not changed 
the [U.S.] strategic goal of dominating the world’s oceans. The United States still 
attempts to rely on its formidable sea power to control the world’s oceans, carry 
out global deployments, [and] continue to brandish military force to “deter wars 
between great powers,” thus maintaining its domination of the world’s oceans. 
The new maritime strategy pointedly emphasizes “forward deployment” and 
seeks to implement “expeditionary” and “multi-role” [capabilities], thus striv-
ing to keep the battlefi eld far away from the American homeland so that U.S. 
security and interests can be realized.
Over the course of the “9/11” incident and the Afghan and Iraq wars, 
from international counterterrorism operations the U.S. Navy recognized 
that the terror wars it confronted were completely different from traditional 
wars. There was uncertainty concerning the combat opponents, the areas 
of operations, the methods of engagement, and the triggering events. There 
were neither clear boundary lines between countries and regions nor con-
ventional precursors of war. The “Chief planner” of U.S. military strategy, 
[former] Assistant Secretary of Defense Andrew Hoehn, believes: “terror-
ism has unprecedented destructiveness, and it travels and connects various 
continents and regions. To deal with it, you must wage a global war.” As a 
result, “counterterrorism” war must use the “great dragnet” of international 
cooperation for global defense.
The new U.S. maritime strategic concept holds that even if a regional war 
is limited, it is still very difficult to achieve complete victory without in-
ternational support, so only through international cooperation can “terror 
war” be prevented and peace obtained. The new strategic concept integrates 
such clauses as “promoting and maintaining cooperative relations with 
more international partners,” and asserts that “emphasis will be placed on 
亚洲一些大国迅速崛起, 经济, 科技实力雄厚, 国家拥有核武器或具有发展核武器的能
力, 将直接影响, 挑战美国的霸权主义.
Some Asian countries are rising rapidly, have abundant economic and technological strength, and 
possess nuclear weapons or the capability to develop them; they will directly infl uence and chal-
lenge American hegemony.
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conf lict prevention through humanitarian rescue and assistance operations 
and strengthening international cooperation.” It emphasizes that preventing 
war is as important as preventing war from expanding, and that preventing 
war from expanding requires international cooperation, so as to avoid af-
fecting the global system and American interests. This is a transformation 
that has caught people’s attention. 
In objectively analyzing the U.S. Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower, one can see that the “2007 edition” of the new maritime strategy 
is relatively moderate compared to the previous version in its use of words 
and style. It holds high the great banner of “cooperation,” elevates prevent-
ing war to the same strategic status as winning war, and takes it as an im-
portant mission for U.S. maritime power. For the first time, it acknowledges 
that the present world is “multipolar,” and believes that no country alone 
is capable of safeguarding the world’s maritime areas from terrorism and 
other threats. This thinking is suited to dealing concretely with world con-
ditions. But the hegemonic U.S. thinking of dominating the world’s oceans 
has not changed at all. While the new strategy has produced some rhetorical 
changes, what it enumerates are essentially responses to the current global 
security situation and [consequent] requirements for America’s own inter-
ests. Its emphasis on “international cooperation” and demand for “allied 
participation” serve the U.S. global strategy. The people of the entire world 
are glad to see this transformation in strategic thinking, [but] will wait and 
see, hoping for genuine actions and practical results.
NEWS BACKGROUND
On 17 November, at the “International Seapower” Symposium held in the 
U.S. state of Rhode Island, a report entitled A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower was rapidly transmitted all over the world, arousing a 
high degree of attention among the world’s navies. Many articles have been 
written by military-theoretical circles to interpret and comment on the re-
port. Why did this alarm the world? First, this document was jointly signed 
and issued by the three leading figures of U.S. maritime power—Chief of 
Naval Operations Roughead, Marine Corps Commandant Conway, and 
Coast Guard Commandant Allen—a rare occurrence. Second, at the Naval 
War College’s international naval symposium in Newport, Rhode Island, 
the new U.S. maritime strategy was announced in front of the heads of 
navies from over one hundred nations and regions. This is the first time in 
U.S. history that America’s maritime forces—the Navy, Marine Corps and 
Coast Guard—jointly formulated and publicly announced a unified mari-
time strategy at an “international conference.”
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AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY: THE NAVY, DARING VANGUARD OF U.S. 
GLOBAL STRATEGY
The conclusion of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower points out: 
“this strategy focuses on opportunities—not threats; on optimism—not fear; 
and on confi dence—not doubt. . . . In the future, the navy will continue to unite 
in executing this strategy. U.S. maritime forces will always safeguard the nation 
and its major interests.” Obviously, the new U.S. maritime strategy’s issuance 
demonstrates that the strategic status of U.S. maritime forces has been further 
elevated. This is also the motivating reason and the result of the ability of the 
three U.S. maritime forces to work together to issue the new maritime strategy.
The Navy is the core force in strategic regions. The U.S. Navy continues to 
serve as the daring vanguard and main force of U.S. global strategy. The new 
strategy is absolutely unequivocal: “From now on, U.S. sea power will be con-
centrated in areas that have heightened tension or require the United States to 
fulfi ll commitments to allies. The United States will continue to deploy power-
ful operational forces in the Western Pacifi c, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian 
Ocean to protect U.S. and allied interests, and contain potential competitors.” 
The U.S. Navy is hoisting the banner of “humanitarian assistance operations 
and strengthening international cooperation,” and continuing “forward de-
ployment” in maritime hotspots. Wherever a crisis emerges, U.S. carrier battle 
group[s] will appear there; this kind of strategic deployment cannot change.
Although A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower projects the pleas-
ant wording of “peace,” “cooperation,” and “war prevention,” hegemonic think-
ing remains its main thread. For example, “we cannot permit a circumstance to 
arise in which our maritime power is deprived of mobility and freedom to oper-
ate in the sea lanes. Similarly, we cannot permit any enemy to attempt to block 
or disrupt major channels of maritime commerce or communication, thereby 
cutting off global supply lines. In circumstances of necessity, we have the ca-
pacity to control maritime space in any region, ideally with partners or allies 
participating, but alone when necessary.” Clearly, what is behind “cooperation” 
is America’s interests, having “partners or the participation of allies” likewise 
serves America’s global interests.
Strengthening “dynamic deployment.” As a result of the current uncertainty 
concerning maritime crises, the “static deployment mode” of large, fi xed mili-
tary bases is already unsuited to the requirements of the “war against terror.” The 
U.S. Navy’s overseas bases are decreasing in number, and it is shifting toward a 
“dynamic projection mode” of small-scale and temporary bases and globally 
deployed fl eets. In line with the new maritime strategy, through “regular, tem-
porary operations” such as joint military exercises and provision of humanitar-
ian assistance, the U.S. military can leave behind a small number of important 
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military offi cials and turn places of strategic importance into “semi-permanent” 
bases; thus maintaining de facto military presence, still fi rmly withholding the 
U.S. global military strategic network, and implementing strategic encirclement 
of different kinds of maritime fl ashpoints and “potential enemy” through mili-
tary deployment in “chokepoints” of navigation and strategic nodes. In this way, 
[the United States] can not only continue to preserve its military presence in 
strategic areas, but also avoid the “tremendous political risk” from maintaining 
overseas military bases. [The United States] can thus “kill two birds with one 
stone.”
Playing the leading role in the “war against terror.” Because of the navy’s 
special characteristics—such as its mobility, which gives it the ability to advance 
and withdraw, to deter and fi ght—naval fl eets necessarily receive favorable at-
tention. The exceptional document, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea-
power, formulated jointly by America’s three maritime forces, demonstrates that 
[the Navy] has been placed in an extremely prominent position. In peacetime, 
through “forward deployment,” the fl eet “places the city under siege” in its de-
terrent effect. At the outset of war, warships shoot the “fi rst shot” by launching 
guided missiles. In the course of war, naval vessels are both weapon launching 
platforms and mobile arsenals. At the conclusion of war, they can rapidly leave 
the battleground. In the Iraq “War to Overthrow Saddam,” the naval fl eet was 
thoroughly brought into play with essential functions. In the domains of war 
time and space, the Navy has an indispensable role and achieves results that cap-
ture the attention of the world and receive “acclaim” from the U.S. authorities 
and the military, and it is regarded as an indispensable “trump card” for future 
“anti-terrorism” operations.
T R A N S L AT O R ’ S  N O T E 
The article was originally published in People’s Navy, 27 November 2007, p. 3. The chief editor of 
that edition was Wu Chao, the intern editor Yuan Zhenjun.
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